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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Donald Rossignol, Jr., appeals from his convictions for lewd conduct with 
a minor under sixteen years of age and sexual abuse of a child. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
S.R. went to live with her father, Rossignol, after her mother died in a car 
accident. (Tr., p.793, L.15 - p.794, L.3.) S.R. was seven years old and in the 
second grade when she moved in with her father. (Tr., p.794, Ls.11-13.) S.R. 
was a participant in the "Bear Buddy" program -- a mentoring program for 
children at Lena Whitman Elementary School in Moscow, Idaho. (Tr., p.982, 
L.18 - p.983, L.17.) Clara Hill was assigned as S.R.'s mentor. When S.R.'s 
father, Rossignol, decided to take S.R. out of the program, Ms. Hill met with S.R. 
to tell her goodbye. (Tr., p.987, L.15 - p.991, L.19.) 
At that meeting Ms. Hill asked S.R. if her father had told her that she 
would no longer participate in the program. (Tr., p.991, Ls.4-18.) S.R. said he 
had but that she could not discuss it because it was about the "secret." (Tr., 
p.991, Ls.15-18.) Ms. Hill encouraged S.R. to tell her about the secret if it 
involved the Bear Buddy program. (Tr., p.991, Ls.21-24.) S.R. said she would if 
Ms. Hill promised not to tell anyone. (Tr., p.991, L.21 - p.992, L.16.) Ms. Hill said 
she could not promise not to tell some secrets, but it would be a good idea if she 
told her. (Tr., p.992, Ls.5-8.) S.R. had Ms. Hill move her to another more private 
room and where S.R. started whispering. (Tr., p.992, L.10 - p.993, L.2.) S.R. 
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then disclosed that she was being sexually abused by her father. (Tr., p.993, L.1 
- p.995, L.2.) 
Specifically, S.R. told Ms. Hill that her father was teaching her about 
massaging but that it was not really massaging and that it was not right. (Tr., 
p.993, Ls.2-8.) When Ms. Hill asked what she meant by that S.R. said her father 
massaged her in her "private places" and pointed to her chest and crotch. (Tr., 
p.993, Ls.2-17.) S.R. asked Ms. Hill if she knew what a boy's private parts 
looked like and Ms. Hill said she did. S.R. then said, "well, my Dad makes me 
put my mouth on his." (Tr., p.993, Ls.19-25.) S.R. then said, "and there's the 
really bad thing too." When asked what she meant, S.R. said that her "father 
showed her pictures of men and women having S-E-X." (Tr., p.993, L.25 - p.994, 
L.4.) 
Following this conversation, Ms. Hill brought S.R. to Betty Heidelberger, 
the counselor at the elementary school. (Tr., p.996, Ls.1-9.) S.R. also told Mrs. 
Heidelberger that she was being abused by Rossignol (Tr., p.1028, Ls.9-15) and 
that she was afraid of being alone with him (Tr., p.1029, Ls.12-14). Following an 
additional interview with Detective Margaret Lehmbecker and Investigator 
Rhonda Schultz from Health and Welfare, S.R. was removed from the home and 
placed in state's custody. (Tr., p.1078, Ls.2-10.) 
As part of the investigation, Rossignol's computer was seized. (Tr., 
p.1097, L.1 - p.1098, L.3; p.842, Ls.13-20.) Consistent with S.R.'s disclosures 
about her abuse, an analysis of the computer revealed pornographic images. 
(Tr., p.852, Ls.15-20.) In addition to showing that Rossignol had accessed 
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pornographic images similar to those sex acts described by his daugher, the 
computer also revealed that Rossignol had accessed internet stories of incest. 
(Tr., p.877, L.11 - p.878, L.21.) 
Rossignol was charged with three counts of lewd conduct with a minor 
under sixteen and one count of sexual abuse of a child. (R., pp.80-82.) The 
defendant was released on his own recognizance at his initial appearance. (R., 
p.84.) Rossignol was bound over to the district court on the same charges after 
a preliminary hearing and after a criminal information was filed. (R., pp.88-90; 
106-108.) 
During this time, Rossignol was involved in a child protection case 
regarding his daughter based on the same underlying facts and allegations as 
the criminal action. (R., pp.158-59.) Following Rossignol's testimony at an 
adjudicatory hearing in the child protective matter, the state filed additional 
charges claiming Rossignol had perjured himself at the hearing. (R., pp.158-59.) 
In the present case, the criminal action, the state filed a motion to increase bail 
because it believed that "the release of the defendant on his own recognizance 
[was] inadequate to insure the defendant's future appearance." (R., p.159.) 
Rossignol was ordered to appear on the motion. (R., p.219.) Rossignol 
failed to appear and his release on his own recognizance was revoked. (R., p. 
292.) The jury trial date was vacated and the court issued a bench warrant. Two 
months later, Rossignol turned himself into authorities. (R., p.369.) The jury trial 
was rescheduled (R., p.369) and the state moved to amend the information to 
include a persistent violator allegation (R., pp.397-98). 
3 
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The matter proceeded to trial. (R., p.922.) The trial ended in a mistrial 
when the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. (R., p.922.) The trial 
was reset, and the case proceeded to a second trial. At that second trial the jury 
found Rossignol guilty on all counts, including the persistent violator charge. (R., 
pp.1230-31.) Rossignol was sentenced to forty years with thirty years fixed on 
each of the four counts to run concurrent. (R., pp.1318-19.) 
Rossignol filed a timely appeal. (R., p.1325.) 
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ISSUES 
Rossignol states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the court erred when it gave an erroneous reasonable 
doubt instruction? 
2. Whether the court erred by admitting evidence of Mr. Rossignol's 
flight? 
3. Whether the court erred when it admitted evidence of adult 
pornography and incest stories found on Mr. Rossignol's computer? 
4. Whether Mr. Rossignol was deprived of due process when the 
court admitted evidence that it had earlier ruled inadmissible and 
the defense relied on the pre-trial ruling? 
5. Whether the court erred when it held that the child-related 
communications exception to the psychologist-patient privilege did 
not apply in this case and so prohibited examination of the victim's 
psychologist? 
6. Whether the doctrine of cumulative error requires reversal? 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Rossignol failed to show error in the jury instruction defining 
reasonable doubt? 
2. Did the district court properly exercise its discretion when it admitted 
evidence that Rossignol missed hearing dates and fled the jurisdiction 
prior to trial? 
3. Did the district court properly exercise its discretion when it admitted two 
one page exhibits containing pornographic images corroborating the 
testimony of S.R. and three stories of father/daughter incest were not 
propensity evidence but evidence of Rossignol's intent and motive to 
engage in sexual relations with his daughter? 
4. Did the district court correctly determine that there was no inconsistency 
between its pretrial and trial ruling on the admissibility of the transcript 
from the interview conducted by Detective Lehmbecker and, 
consequently, that Rossignol was not denied due process? 
5. Has Rossignol failed to show either that the district court erred in not 
permitting him to cross-examine at the competency hearing, S.R.'s 
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psychologist regarding S.R.'s treatment, or that Rossignol was prejudiced 
by the court's determination? 
6. Has Rossignol failed to show any error, much less two or more errors that 
would make the doctrine of cumulative error applicable to this case? 
6 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Rossignol Has Failed To Show The District Court's Reasonable Doubt Instruction 
Was Erroneous 
A. Introduction 
Rossignol argues the district court's reasonable doubt instruction was 
erroneous, claiming it "misled and confused the jury since it cobbled together 
various statements of the law and also left out a vital concept regarding the 
burden of proof which had the effect of lessening the state's burden." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Rossignol's jury instruction claim fails because the 
court's instruction correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt exactly as 
provided in the model instruction and because the instruction was not misleading 
and did not diminish the state's burden of proof. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 712, 85 
P.3d 1109, 1111 (Ct. App. 2003). When reviewing jury instructions, courts must 
determine whether the instructions, as a whole, fairly and adequately present the 
issues and state the law. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 273, 77 P.3d 956, 
962 (2003). 
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C. Rossignol Has Failed To Show The Reasonable Doubt Instruction Given 
By The District Court Contained A Constitutionally Defective Definition Of 
Reasonable Doubt 
When reviewing a "reasonable doubt" instruction, the Constitution does 
not dictate that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the 
state's burden of proof, so long as taken as a whole, the instructions correctly 
convey the concept of reasonable doubt. Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 273, 77 P .3d at 
962. Therefore, an erroneous instruction does not constitute reversible error 
unless the instructions, when taken as a whole, misled the jury or prejudiced a 
party. .lQ.,. Further, the Idaho Supreme Court has also specifically noted that 
reasonable doubt instructions, like the one given in this case, do not need to be 
verbatim recitations of the relevant Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction in order to 
survive a challenge on appeal.1 _lQ.,_ at 274, 77 P.3d at 963 (citing State v. Harris, 
136 Idaho 484, 485, 36 P.3d 836, 837 (Ct. App. 2001 )). However, it has been 
recognized that "pattern ICJI instructions are presumptively correct." State v. 
Ruel, 141 Idaho 600,602,114 P.3d 158,160 (Ct. App. 2005). 
The district court gave the following jury instruction explaining the 
reasonable doubt standard: 
A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent. Thus, 
although accused, the defendant begins this trial with a clean slate. 
In addition the defendant has a constitutional right not to testify and 
you are to draw absolutely no inferences against him/her if he/she 
exercises his/her right to remain silent. 
1 The state acknowledges and does not disagree with the Idaho Supreme Court's 
efforts to encourage district courts to use the approved Idaho Criminal Jury 
Instructions to avoid "unnecessary appeals and controversy." Sheahan, 139 
Idaho at 275, 77 P.3d at 964; State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573,577,602 P.2d 71, 
75 (1979) (citing State v. Holm, 93 Idaho 904,478 P.2d 284 (1970)). 
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The State must prove all material elements of the offense charged 
in the Information to be true beyond a reasonable doubt before the 
defendant can be guilty. In order to help you in your duties as 
jurors I am going to outline for you the elements of the crime for 
which the defendant has been charged. 
The State must prove that on unknown dates between January, 
2005 and September, 2005 in Idaho that Mr. Rossignol did commit 
lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen years of age as described 
in three of the counts against him and that he sexually abused a 
child as described in the remaining count. 
It is not necessary for the State to establish every fact and 
circumstance put in evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, but it is 
necessary to sustain a conviction that the facts and circumstances 
in evidence, when take together, establish beyond a reasonable 
doubt each of the material elements of offense that I have outlined. 
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not mere possible 
doubt, because everything relating to human affairs, and depending 
on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It 
is the state of the case which, after the entire comparison and 
consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in that 
condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a 
moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. 
(Instruction No. 3; R., pp.1189-90.) This instruction, Instruction No. 3, 
incorporates language from ICJI 103, the model jury instruction, including a 
verbatim recitation of the final paragraph that explicitly defines "reasonable 
doubt." ICJI 103 reads as follows: 
A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent. This 
presumption places upon the state the burden of proving the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, a defendant, 
although accused, begins the trial with a clean slate with no 
evidence against the defendant. If, after considering all the 
evidence and my instructions on the law, you have a reasonable 
doubt as to the defendant's guilt, you must return a verdict of not 
guilty. 
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not mere possible 
doubt, because everything relating to human affairs, and depending 
on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It 
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is the state of the case which, after the entire comparison and 
consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in that 
condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a 
moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. 
Despite using almost the entire language of ICJI 103, including the entire portion 
that defines reasonable doubt, Rossignol claims the court's instruction "misled 
and confused the jury." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) The primary argument in 
support of this claim is Rossignol's assertion that the jury was never informed 
that the defendant never has "the burden or duty of calling any witness or 
producing any evidence." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) This criticism is unfounded 
and is not a basis for finding error. 
While Instruction No. 3 did not explicitly say that a defendant is not 
required to call any witnesses or produce any evidence, the instruction made 
clear that the burden of proof was on the state to prove, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, every element of the crime with which Rossignol was charged: "The State 
must prove all the material elements of the offense charged in the Information to 
be true beyond a reasonable doubt before the defendant can be found guilty." 
(Instruction No. 3.) The court further instructed that "[i]t is not necessary for the 
State to establish every fact and circumstance put in evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt, but it is necessary to sustain a conviction that the facts and 
circumstances in evidence, when taken together, establish beyond a reasonable 
doubt each of the material elements of offense [sic] that I have outlined." 
(Instruction No. 3.) Because this is incontrovertibly a fair and accurate statement 
of the law, Instruction No. 3 cannot be considered inaccurate or misleading. 
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Nor can Instruction No. 3 be considered incomplete or inadequate. The 
state acknowledges the alternative instruction ICJI 103A contains the language 
Rossignol claims should have been added. However, the standard instruction, 
ICJI 103, does not include that language. Consequently, if the model instruction 
does not include that language, and is presumed sufficient, it necessarily follows 
that the mere absence of that language in Instruction No. 3 cannot be the basis 
for claiming error. It is sufficient, as was undisputedly the case here, that the jury 
is informed of the state's burden without referring to the fact that a defendant has 
no burden to produce evidence. 
Rossignol also claims Instruction No. 3 lowers the burden for the state. 
Specifically, Rossignol claims the "comparison" language in the final paragraph 
of Instruction No. 3 suggests that a defendant does in fact have a burden of 
presenting evidence where no such requirement exists. The "compare" language 
used by the court comes directly from ICJI 103: "It is the state of the case which, 
after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the 
minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding 
conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge." 
The instruction to the jury to compare and consider all the evidence 
presented does not suggest that Rossignol has a burden to produce evidence. It 
merely instructs juries to consider the evidence that has been presented in 
determining whether the state has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Nothing in that paragraph suggests that a criminal defendant has to present 
evidence or that the state is excused of its burden of proving the defendant's guilt 
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beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, because this language comes from the 
model instruction it is presumed to be correct. See Ruel, 141 Idaho at 602, 114 
P.3d at 160. Rossignol has not met his burden of overcoming this presumption. 
A. 
fl. 
Rossignol Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Admitting Evidence Of Flight At Trial 
Introduction 
The district court denied Rossignol's motion in limine to exclude evidence 
of flight at trial, ruling that the evidence was relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. 
On appeal, Rossignol argues the evidence of flight should have been excluded 
because the evidence was not relevant and because it was unfairly prejudicial. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.21.) The basis for his argument in support of exclusion is 
that there were additional charges, claims of perjury in the child protection case, 
which were also pending against him. (Appellant's Brief, p.21.) Rossignol claims 
that because there "was clearly an additional reason or reasons for the flight" that 
evidence was prejudicial and irrelevant. (Appellant's Brief, p.21.) This argument 
has no merit. A review of the record shows that evidence of Rossignol's flight 
was relevant to the accusations that he sexually abused his daughter. 
Furthermore, there is also no support in the record for Rossignol's claim that the 
admission of that evidence unfairly prejudiced him. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Appellate courts review de nova the trial court's determination of whether 
evidence is relevant; however, they review all other evidentiary rulings for an 
12 
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abuse of discretion. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 766, 864 P.2d 596, 
604 (1993). Thus, the trial court's determination that the probative value of the 
"flight" evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. State v. Moore, 131 
Idaho 814, 819, 965 P.2d 174, 179 (1998). 
C. The Trial Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion In Determining The 
Evidence Of Flight Was Relevant And Not Unfairly Preiudicial 
In determining whether to admit evidence which is probative on the issue 
of flight to avoid prosecution, a trial court must conduct a two-part analysis. State 
v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 819, 965 P.2d 174, 179 (1998). "First, the judge must 
determine that the evidence is relevant under I.R.E: 401, and second, the judge 
must determine that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." & (citing State v. Friedley. 122 
Idaho 321, 834 P.2d 323 (Ct. App. 1992)). 
At the hearing on Rossignol's motion in limine, the court was advised that 
the state intended to present testimony that Rossignol missed a hearing and fled 
the jurisdiction prior to trial. After Rossignol was arraigned on the lewd conduct 
and child abuse charges he posted bond and was released on his own 
recognizance. (R., p.84.) After Rossignol was charged with additional crimes --
giving perjured testimony in the child protection case -- the state filed a motion to 
increase bond was filed and the court ordered Mr. Rossignol to appear. (R., 
pp.158-59.) Rossignol failed to appear at that hearing. (R., p.292.) In response 
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to Rossignol's failure to appear, the judge vacated the trial date and issued a 
bench warrant. (R., pp.959-60.) 
Rossignol argued to the district court that his flight was not evidence of 
guilt because he did not flee at the first opportunity and appeared at many 
hearings concerning the child protection proceedings. (R., p.587), He also 
claimed that the circumstances surrounding his departure from the jurisdiction do 
not clearly point to one particular reason and that he could not explain his flight 
without referring to the perjury charge and this reference would be more 
prejudicial than probative. (R., p.959) The district court rejected Rossignol's 
arguments and concluded that the flight was probative evidence of Rossignol's 
guilt: 
Mr. Rossignol fled from the state while very serious charges 
were pending against him and a trial date was quickly approaching. 
The maximum penally for lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor 
is life in prison. The maximum penalty for perjury is fourteen years. 
The new allegations were directly related to the Child Protection Act 
proceedings which arose out of the charges al issue here. It is 
objectively unreasonable to conclude that the perjury charges, as a 
discreet event, rather than the convergence of events relating to the 
child sex abuse charges, gave rise to Mr. Rossignol's flight. 
(R., p.959.) The district court also concluded that the relevant evidence was not 
"unfairly prejudicial" and concluded that the evidence of Rossignol's flight was 
admissible. (R., p.959.) 
Rossignol makes the same arguments on appeal that he made to the 
district court below. Rossignol has failed to show, however, that the district 
court's determination that evidence of Rossignol's flight was relevant was 
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incorrect or that the district court abused its discretion when it concluded the 
probative nature of the evidence outweighed the potential of unfair prejudice. 
1. Evidence Of Rossignol's Flight Was Relevant To Whether He 
Engaged In Lewd And Lascivious Conduct And Sexually Abused 
His Daughter 
Rossignol has failed to show error in the district court's determination that 
evidence of Rossignol's flight was relevant. Rossignol fled the jurisdiction as his 
trial was quickly approaching and just before bail was likely to be increased. 
Rossignol's flight came, therefore, just before his freedom was likely to be 
curtailed and just before he was to be adjudicated by a jury on charges that 
carried the potential for life imprisonment. Furthermore, as noted by the district 
court, the child protection proceeding and perjury charges were all directly 
connected to the child abuse and lewd and lascivious charges. Consequently, 
evidence of Rossignol's flight was relevant to whether he engaged in lewd and 
lascivious conduct and sexually abused his daughter -- the claims at issue in this 
case -- as well as in the child protective case. As such, the district court properly 
determined that evidence of Rossignol's flight was probative of his guilt. 
2. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Determined 
That The Probabitive Value Of The Flight Evidence Was Not 
Outweighed By Any Unfair Prejudice 
The district court properly exercised its discretion when it concluded the 
probative value of the flight evidence was not outweighed by unfair prejudice. 
Rossignol claims the "evidence of flight should not have been admitted due to the 
unfair prejudice of not being able to explain all the possible motives for the flight 
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without admitting otherwise inadmissible evidence." (Appellant's Brief, p.22.) 
Rossignol claims this "otherwise inadmissible evidence" was evidence regarding 
Rossignol's perjury in the related child protection case. However, Rossignol has 
failed to articulate what this evidence, unrelated to the sex abuse case, might 
have been. Because the perjury charges flowed from and were directly related to 
the charges of lewd conduct and sexual abuse of his daughter, there was no 
reason for fleeing the perjury charge that was not related to the child abuse case. 
Significantly, because Rossignol has failed to articulate what those unrelated 
reasons for fleeing might have been, he has failed to meet his burden of showing 
an abuse of discretion by the district court. 
111. 
Rossignol Has Failed To Show The Court Erred When It Admitted The 
Pornography And Incest Stories Found On Rossignol's Computer 
A. Introduction 
At trial, the court permitted the state to introduce two on page exhibits 
containing five pornographic images (Exhibits 10 and 11) and three stories of 
father/daughter incest (Exhibits 7, 8, and 9) found on Rossignol's computer. 
Rossignol argues the two exhibits were not relevant and unfairly prejudicial. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.25-26.) Rossignol also claims the stories of father/daughter 
incest were impermissible under I.RE. 404 and I.RE. 403. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.25-26.) Rossignol's arguments are without merit. The selected pornographic 
images were relevant to corroborate Rossignol's daughter's statements that her 
father showed her pornographic images on his computer and then engaged in 
similar sexual acts with her. Additionally, the stories of incest did not constitute 
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impermissible propensity evidence but were relevant to show Rossignol's intent, 
motive, and plan to engage in sexual acts with his daughter and were not 
substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice. 
8. Standard Of Review 
Relevance of evidence is reviewed de nova, but other questions of 
admissibility of evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996); State v. Lamphere, 130 
Idaho 630,632,945 P.2d 1, 3 (1997). 
This same appellate standard of review applies to evidence that is 
admitted pursuant to I.RE. 404(b). The district court's relevancy ruling is subject 
to free review on appeal, but the district court's ruling that the probative value of 
the evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice is reviewed 
only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Labelle, 126 Idaho 564, 887 P.2d 1071 
(1995). 
C. The Pornography Found On Rossignol's Computer Was Relevant To 
Corroborate Rossignol's Daughter's Testimony And Was Not Unfairly 
Prejudicial 
Prior to trial, Rossignol filed a motion in limine, seeking to exclude "[a]ny 
pornographic or sexual images found on any computer seized from the Rossignol 
home." (R., p.938.) Rossignol claimed the pornography should be excluded 
because the images were not corrobative of S.R.'s testimony and because the 
images were highly prejudicial. (R., pp.945-46.) The district court rejected this 
argument, incorporating the reasons articulated in its previous ruling before the 
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first trial. (R., p.1108.) There, the court reasoned that the pictures found on the 
computer were corroborative because the pornography admitted was identified 
as being saved by Rossignol to his computer and because the pornography 
matched the testimony of the victim -- that her father had shown her pornography 
that involved "vaginal touching, oral sex and other forms of touching." (R., 
p.964.) On appeal, Rossignol claims the court abused its discretion by admitting 
the pornographic images because the victim failed to identify a "particular picture 
as something which she had seen" and, "that, at most, the court should have 
permitted evidence describing the pornography found without admitting the 
actual pictures." (Appellant's Brief, p.26.) Rossignol's claims lack merit and do 
not show that the pornography was irrelevant or that the district court abused its 
discretion in concluding that the pornography was admissible because it 
corroborated the victim's testimony. 
The record shows that Rossignol's daughter made statements that the 
images her father showed her on his computer were similar to the sex acts that 
he forced her to engage in: 
Q. How old were you when your dad was doing this to you? 
A. Seven. Seven and six. 
Q. Okay. The pictures that he was showing you on the 
computer were they like what he was doing to you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In what way? 
A. A lot of ways that I just said. Like -- like sucking the dick --
sucking his dick, that's one picture. 
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(Tr., p.257, Ls.1-7.) Indeed, a review of the pornographic images admitted into 
evidence at trial shows that they depict the very sex acts that Rossignol engaged 
in with his seven-old-daughter, including fondling her breasts, oral to genital 
contact, and manual to genital contact. (See State's Exhibit's 10 and 11; 
compare Tr., p.250, L.2 - p.256, L.13; p.795, L.13 - p.807, L.18; p.993, L.2 -
p.994, L.4.) Consequently, the specific images found on Rossignol's computer 
and admitted into evidence are probative because they show that Rossignol's 
daughter was telling the truth about the existence of pornography on the 
computer and that pornographic images consistent with the sex acts her father 
engaged in with her existed on Rosssignol's computer. This evidence is relevant 
because it corroborated the statements the victim gave during the investigation 
and at trial. 
Furthermore, the pornography was also an integral part of the abuse itself 
and, therefore, directly related to the crime. Prior to trial, the victim specifically 
testified that Rossignol repeatedly showed her pornography as part of her abuse 
and in preparation for sex acts: 
Q. Okay. Can you tell me what he did when he sexually 
abused you? 
A. The third time he showed me pictures on the computer. 
Q. What kind of pictures did he show you? 
A. Like with a man and a woman and some with a man naked, 
some were with a woman and some with the man and 
woman naked. 
Q. And what was happening in the pictures? 
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A. Well, they were sexually abusing. Well, the woman was 
either sexually abusing the man or the man was either 
sexually abusing the woman. 
Q. Where were the pictures at? 
A. On his -- well, in his office. 
Q. Okay. What was he using to show you the pictures? 
A. The computer with the little mouse. 
Q. Okay. How many pictures did he show you? 
A. I don't know maybe 13, 14. 
Q. So he showed you more than one picture? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. How many times did he show you the pictures? 
A. Five, six, seven. 
Q. When he was showing you the pictures where was he at? 
A. He was in the office. 
Q. Where were you at? 
A. I was sitting in the office. 
Q. Where were you sitting in the office? 
A. On his chair. 
Q. Was it the same chair your dad was sitting in? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So were you sitting next to him or were you sitting on his 
lap? 
A. On his lap. 
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Q. What was he wearing? 
A. The first time he had clothes on. The second time he didn't. 
(Tr., p.245, L.25 - p.248, L.7.) 
At trial, S.R. provided similar testimony linking the abuse to the viewing of 
pornography on Rossignol's computer: 
Q. Did he do anything else with you that same night that he 
touched your penis [the young child referred to her vagina as 
her penis]? 
A. Well, in the morning he took me to the -- to his computer and 
showed me maybe ladies, maybe teenagers naked together. 
Q. I'm sorry, I missed part of that. Could you re-say that? 
A. Maybe ladies, maybe teenagers naked together on his 
computer. 
0. Okay. How did you get into the place where he showed you 
the pictures? 
A. I walked. 
Q. Where were you at when he first came --
A. My bedroom. 
Q. What were you doing? 
A. Sleeping. 
0. So did he wake you up? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And how did he show you the pictures? Can you describe 
what happened? 
A. He like typed them up. 
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Q. Okay, and where were you at in the office? 
A. I was with his computer. 
(Tr., p.799, L.12-p.800, L.11.) 
Thus, in addition to corroborating the victim's testimony regarding the 
pornography that was shown to her on her father's computer, the images also 
corroborated the victim's testimony that the pornography, viewed on Rossignol's 
computer, was part of her systematic abuse. 
Because the images provided strong corroboration for the victim's 
testimony, the pornographic images were highly probative and the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the probative nature was not 
outweighed by the possibility of unfair prejudice. See lz&., State v. Rood, 848 
P.2d 128, 131 (Or. App. 1993) (concluding trial court properly admitted graphic 
pornographic video where victim claimed the defendant played the video when 
he was abused and because, although prejudicial, the court concluded that the 
video was highly probative in that it confirmed aspecb of the victim's account of 
the crime). Here, the porngraphic images established the victim's testimony as 
credible and, as such, was highly probative. Given the probative nature of 
evidence, the court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the 
probative value of the pornography, limited to just two exhibits, was not 
outweighed by any unfair prejudice. 
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D. The Incest Stories Found On Rossignol's Computer Were Admissible As 
I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence To Show Rossignol's Intent And Motive To Have A 
Sexual Relationship With His Daughter 
Rule 404(b) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence provides that evidence of 
other "crimes, wrongs, or acts" is generally inadmissible to prove the character of 
a person or that the person acted in conformity with that character. I.R.E. 404(b). 
Such evidence is admissible, however, to prove matters other than propensity. 
I.R.E. 404(b). Such permissible purposes include, proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178,845 P.2d 1211 (1993); State v. 
Tolman, 121 Idaho 899, 828 P.2d 1304 (1992); State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743, 
819 P.2d 1143 (1991). 
Here, Rossignol claims the district court erred because, he contends, the 
stories of incest found on his computer were admitted into evidence "to show that 
Mr. Rossignol had a propensity to commit incest." (Appellant's Brief, p.28.) 
Alternatively, Rossignol claims that even if the stories were relevant for a 
purpose other than propensity, the district court nevertheless erred in admitting 
them because, he argues, they were unfairly prejudicial and the jury did not need 
to see the actual stories but only needed to be informed that the stories of incest 
were found on his computer. (Appellant's Brief, p.29.) 
Rossignol's claims fail. It is clear the incest stories -- stories about a 
father having sex with his daughter -- were relevant for a permissible purpose. 
The fact that Rossignol downloaded to his computer fantasy stories of a father 
having sex with his daughter is relevant to establishing Rossignol's sexual intent 
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and motives toward his daughter. See, !Uh, United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 
935, 951 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining why possession of child sex stories is 
evidence of intent to have sex with underage girl). Rossignol's possession of the 
stories corroborated the victim's testimony that her father had sexual relations 
with her. Consequently, the district court properly concluded that the stories 
were relevant for a purpose other than to show propensity. 
Rossignol's assertion that the court should have precluded the state from 
introducing the actual stories is without merit. It was the detail of the stories that 
made them relevant to the present case and that provided corroboration for the 
victim's testimony. Consequently, although graphic and prejudicial (in the sense 
that it tended to establish Rossignol's guilt, the detail was directly related to the 
probative value of stories in determining Rossignol's intent and motive. 
Accordingly, admission of this detail was not unfairly prejudicial and the 
determination by the district court was not an abuse of discretion. See State v. 
Leavitt, 116 Idaho 285, 290, 775 P.2d 599, 604 (1989) (concluding that evidence 
is not unfairly prejudicial merely because it is detrimental to a party's case). 
A. 
IV. 
Rossignol Has Failed To Show He Was Deprived Of Due Process When The 
Court Admitted Detective Lehmbecker's Interview Of The Victim 
Introduction 
Prior to the first trial the district court ruled the victim's prior consistent 
statements to Clara Hill (mentor), Elizabeth Heidelberger (school counselor), 
Detective Margaret Lehmbecker, and Health and Welfare investigator Rholda 
Schulz (following S.R.'s disclosure to Ms. Hill) would be admitted "only if the 
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credibility or motive of S.R:s accusations are contested." (R., p.966.) After 
defense counsel opened the door by questioning the victim's credibility based on 
her version of events at trial, the trial court permitted the prior consistent 
testimony of S.R. to Detective Lehmbecker to be admitted. (R., pp. 1174-75.) 
Prior to the second trial, the district court provided a different ruling. The 
district court, pursuant to motion, ruled that S.R.'s statements to Ms. Hill "meet 
the standards of IRE 803(24) [and were admissible]" but that "S.R.'s accounts to 
Ms. Heidelberger, Ms. Schultz and Detective Lembecker are simply repetitive 
accounts of the same testimony expected of S.R. at trial" and, consequently, that 
those accounts "are cumulative hearsay without the same inherent indicia of 
reliability on balance and as such should not be admitted." (R., p.1115.) 
During trial, the defense did not attack the inconsistencies in S.R.'s 
statements regarding the abuse but rather suggested that S.R. fabricated her 
story as evidenced by her use of the words "massage" and "hole" -- terms that 
defense claimed came from her experiences in Wyoming before she moved in 
with her father. To rebut that claim, the state sought to admit S.R.'s interview 
with Detective Lehmbecker during which S.R. used a more extensive vocabulary 
to describe her abuse. (Tr., p.1535, L.25 - p.18.) In response, Rossignol's 
counsel admitted that this was the defense strategy but claimed that the 
statements to Detective Lehmbecker were still hearsay and not admissible: 
The word massage, yes, we have pointed out that is a word that 
has repeatedly appeared in her statements about what her father 
did to her and that it also was from Chrisandra [her sister in 
Wyoming]. And we are arguing that that was picked up by her. It's 
not just a coincidence that the word her sister used is the word she 
uses. 
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(Tr., p.1537, L.23 - p.1538, L.4.) The district court rejected Rossignol's argument 
and permitted the transcript of the interview to be admitted into evidence. 
After the evidence was admitted Rossignol moved for reconsideration. 
(Tr., p.1559, Ls.16-21.) Rossignol claimed, as he does now on appeal 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.34-38), that the decision to admit the transcript was a 
violation of his due process rights under the Idaho and United States 
Constitutions (Tr., p.1559, L.16 - p.1563, L.4). Specifically, he claimed he 
"should be able to present his case in reliance upon pretrial motions without 
having the rules essentially changed at the end of the game for no reason that 
was not apparent at the beginning of the trial" and that because the court's 
decision to allow the transcript was inconsistent with its in limine motion ruling 
there was "a question of due process of law." (Tr., p.1560, Ls.17-22; see also 
Appellant's Brief, p.34.) 
The district court rejected Rossignol's motion. The court concluded there 
was no inconsistency and, therefore, no due process violation: 
Well, first of all, I don't think it's inconsistent with my in-limine 
rulings. The prior inconsistent statements were kept out of 
substantive evidence. The last trial they were admitted as 
substantive evidence of proof of the matter, the fact of matter of the 
fact [sic) for which is it [sic) offered. That is not the reason that I let 
it in this time. It was let in -- the State is entitled to rebut your 
defense, and your defense has been and consistently has been 
that she learned about all of this in Wyoming. She couldn't have 
learned of it at her home with Donald Rossignol. I think the State is 
entitled to know that she was familiar with terms and experiences 
that transcend what the evidence is that occurred in Wyoming. 
They are entitled to rebut. I don't think it's inconsistent at all. I 
think it's perfectly consistent. One is offered for the proof of the 
matter asserted, and the other is not submitted for that but rather 
what her knowledge was containing certain terms and descriptions. 
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So, I don't agree with you. I mean, the Appellate Court may. You 
are entitled to call [S.R.]. I told that you [sic] from the beginning. 
You can call her back. I would have her called back. If you want to 
do that, you may. I don't think the dynamic has changed at all. If 
you want to examine her about how much she knew in Wyoming 
and how much she didn't know you're entitled to ask that. That's 
your defense. I'm not going to impede your ability to do that in any 
respect. But I'm comfortable with my ruling. 
(Tr., p.1563, l.5- p.1564, L.9.) Consistent with its ruling, the trial court submitted 
a limiting instruction to the jury admonishing them that they could only consider 
the transcript for the purpose of determining S.R.'s sexual vocabulary: 
I have admitted State's Exhibit 25A, a partial transcript of an 
interview of [S.R.] by Det. Lehmbecker, for only one purpose. I 
have admitted it as evidence of the words and phrases [S.R.] used 
to describe sexual parts of the body and actions involving those 
parts of the body. You may not consider this evidence for any other 
purpose. 
This means you may not use State's Exhibit 25A as 
evidence that any of the events [S.R.] described in it actually 
happened. 
(R., p.1209.) 
Rossignol has failed to show how the district court's ruling or reasoning 
was incorrect. The court's pretrial ruling was not inconsistent with its trial ruling 
and there was no due process violation. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Where a defendant claims that his or her right to due process was 
violated, appellate courts defer to the trial court's findings of fact, if supported by 
substantial evidence. State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. 
App. 2001 ). However, appellate courts freely review the application of 
constitutional principles to those facts found. jg,_ 
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C. Rossignol Has Failed To Show Any Inconsistency Between The Trial 
Court's In Limine Ruling And Its Determination To Admit Rebuttal 
Evidence 
The United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant a fair trial 
through the Due Process Clauses. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 
U.S. 140, 146 (2006). Here, Rossignol claims he was denied his right to a fair 
trial because he claims the court changed its pre-trial ruling regarding the 
admissibility of evidence "without a change in circumstance." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.34.) Rossignol has failed to show how the district court's ruling was in error, 
much less that the error violated his due · process rights. Contrary to his 
assertions, there was no inconsistency in the district court's rulings. As correctly 
stated by the district court in its ruling, the motion in limine excluded the 
transcript's admission on a substantive basis as a prior consistent statement. 
This determination was unrelated to and not inconsistent with the court's 
subsequent determination to admit the transcript, not for the truth of the matter 
asserted, but to show knowledge of particular words to rebut a particular defense 
presented by Rossignol. Because there was no inconsistency Rossignol's claim 
of due process violation fails. 
Additionally, contrary to Rossignol's claims, the court's rulings did not alter 
his defense or prevent him from confronting S.R. as a witness. (Appellant's Brief, 
p.36.) Rossignol claims he had "forgone impeachment of S.R. so that the 
interview would not be admitted" and that this had effectively precluded him from 
confronting S.R. as a witness. As the trial court's ruling makes clear, Rossignol 
was free to calf S.R. back to the stand to question her: "I told that you [sic) from 
28 
the beginning. You can call her back. I would have her called back. If you want 
to do that, you may. I don't think the dynamic has changed at all." (Tr., p.1564, 
Ls.1-9.) Thus, there were no inconsistencies in the court's rulings and the district 
court's ruling did not substantively affect Rossignol's ability to make his defense. 
Rossignol has failed to show a violation of his due process rights. 
V. 
Rossignol Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred When It Ruled That 
Rossignol Could Not Examine The Treating Pyschologist Regarding S.R.'s 
Treatment 
A. Introduction 
At S.R.'s competency hearing, the district court precluded Rossignol from 
examining Dr. Von Moltke, S.R.'s current psychologist, regarding "any treatment 
that she's given [to S.R.] or any conclusions she's drawn that she thinks are 
necessary for that treatment" as well as any "communications" related to the 
treatment of S.R. (Tr., p.12, Ls.3-8; p.13, L.5 - p.14, L.12.) The court allowed 
the parties to question the therapist regarding her diagnosis that S.R. had 
reactive attachment disorder and other disorders and how that would affect her 
competency at trial: "I will only allow it in terms of her diagnosis and the extent to 
which that would affect her competency. We're here to determine [S.R.]'s 
competency. We're not here to determine whether her treatment is good or bad 
or what information has been received by a treatment provided in order to 
provide that treatment. I want to keep the focus on competency, okay." (Tr., 
p.14, Ls.18-25.) In support of this determination, the district court discussed the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege, I.R.E. 503. (Tr., p.8, L.15 - p.9, L.22.) 
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Rossignol asserted that the privilege was not applicable because, here, the 
patient was a child and I.R.E. 503(d)(4) excepts child patients from being able to 
use the privilege. (Tr., p.9, Ls.7-25.) The court rejected Rossignol's claim that 
no privilege existed because the patient was a child. The court concluded that 
the child related communications exception referenced in I.R.E. 503(d)(4) related 
to identification of abuse not the subsequent treatment for abuse where the 
condition of the child was already known. (Tr., p.11, L.3- p.10, L.11.) 
Rossignol claims this determination was in error. He argues, as he did at 
the competency hearing, that I.R.E. 503(d)(4) should be interpreted as 
eliminating the psychotherapist-patient privilege where the patient is a child and 
where all the communications to the therapist relate to the child. (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.38-41.) Rossignol's claim is without merit. The language of I.R.E. 
503(d)(4) is not a blanket exception but applies where the communication 
between therapist and patient involves communications that suggests the welfare 
of the child is at risk and not where the abuse is known and the therapist is 
providing treatment for that abuse. Additionally, Rossignol's broad interpretation 
is inconsistent with a child-patient's constitutionally protected privacy interest in 
keeping their treatment private. Furthermore, even if the court erred in its 
determination regarding the privilege, S.R. has failed to show any harm resulting 
from that determination. There was no harm because S.R. was determined to be 
competent and because she ultimately testified at trial. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
Interpretation of the rules of evidence is a matter of law over which the 
appellate courts exercise free review. See State v. Homolka, 131 Idaho 172, 953 
P.2d 612, 613 (1998) (court exercises free review of questions of law); Atkinson 
v. State, 131 Idaho 222,953 P.2d 662,664 (Ct. App. 1998) (same). 
C. f.R.E. 503(d)(4l Does Not Eliminate The Psychotherapist Privilege Where 
The Child Is The Patient 
1.R.E. 503(b)(2) provides that: 
A patient has a privilege in a criminal action to refuse to disclose 
and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential 
communications made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of 
the patient's mental or emotional condition, including alcohol or 
drug addiction, among the patient, the patient's psychotherapist, 
and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment 
under the direction of the psychotherapist, including members of 
the patient's family. 
Rossignol claims this privilege did not apply at S.R.'s competency hearing 
because I.R.E. 503(d)(4) states that: "There is no privilege under this rule in a 
criminal or civil action or proceeding as to a communication relevant to an issue 
concerning the physical, mental or emotional condition of or injury to a child, or 
concerning the welfare of a child including but not limited to the abuse, 
abandonment, or neglect of a child." Rossignol claims S.R.'s communications 
with her therapist necessarily related to her condition and, because she is a child, 
no privilege exists. (Appellant's Brief, pp.40-41.) Rossignol's interpretation is 
flawed and constitutionally suspect. 
A plain reading of the rule shows the privilege does not apply when the 
communication pertains to the "condition" or "injury" of a child. For this reason, 
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the court permitted S.R.'s therapist to be questioned regarding S.R.'s condition of 
reactive attachment disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and depression. 
(Tr., p.91, L.19 - p.93, L.12.) However, the court, consistent with the rule and the 
exception precluded the therapist from testifying about post-identification 
treatment -- treatment and information that the child would have an interest in 
keeping confidential. Indeed, where the condition and/or injury of the child is 
known, there is nothing that prevents the court from excluding testimony 
regarding treatment because that treatment is not relevant to the condition of the 
child as it relates to the criminal action. 
Although no court has addressed the novel construction asserted by 
Rossignol, the Idaho Supreme Court has suggested that the purpose of the 
exception is to protect children where the confidential communication suggests 
that a child is being abused or neglected. In State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 119, 
29 P.3d 949, 955 (2001), the Idaho Supreme Court was willing to pierce the 
privilege veil where an adult patient "made any communication to his 
psychologist or counselor relevant to an issue concerning the allegation of sexual 
abuse ... " That is simply not the case here. The communications here concern 
the treatment of abuse not the claim of abuse. Furthermore, there is no Idaho 
case and there appears to be no other case in any other jurisdiction where a 
criminal defendant was permitted to use the exception in an offensive manner 
after the abuse is known -- to essentially gather information regarding the 
treatment of an abused child, ignoring any privacy interest the child may have 
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with regard to that treatment. In short, there is no authority to support the 
expansive interpretation suggested by Rossignol. 
In People v. Stritzinger, 668 P.2d 738 (Cal. 1983), the California Supreme 
Court articulated why the psychotherapist-patient privilege must be narrowly 
construed. The court reasoned that an aspect of the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege incorporated an individual's right to privacy under the California and 
federal constitutions. & at 7 42 ( citing California Constitution and California case 
law identifying federal privacy right articulated in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965)). The court recognized that this privacy interest on the part of a 
patient was not absolute but could be broached by a "compelling state interest." 
jg_,_ "To determine whether the psychotherapist-patient privilege embraced by the 
right to privacy has impermissibly been violated, we begin by considering the 
state's competing interest. Here, that interest is the detection and prevention of 
child abuse .... " jg_,_ at 743. Consequently, in California, the psychotherapist-
patient privilege is construed narrowly taking into account the reason for 
breaching the privacy interest of the client -- protecting the child. 
Here, it is clear that the purpose of the exception contained in I.R.E. 
503( d)( 4) is to protect a similar state interest. The exception illustrates as 
examples of communication that can be disclosed "the abuse, abandonment or 
neglect of a child." I.R.E. 503(d)(4). However, where this is the case, a 
compelling government interest clearly exists, and piercing the privilege is 
consistent with constitutional authority. Where, as here, the exception is being 
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read to exclude any privacy interest of the child, the interpretation is inviolate of 
the child's privacy interest and cannot pass constitutional muster. 
Accordingly, Rossignol's claim that the district court erred in not adopting 
his expansive interpretation of I.RE. 503(d)(4), thereby preventing the 
examination of Dr. Von Moltke on issues relating to S.R.'s treatment at her 
competency hearing, is unpersuasive. 
D. Any Error Regarding The Taking Of Evidence At The Competency 
Hearing Was Harmless Because The Court Ruled In Favor Of Rossignol 
And Found S.R. Competent To Testify 
Even if the district court erred in not allowing Rossignol to examine Dr. 
Von Moltke on issues relating to S.R.'s treatment at her competency hearing, that 
error is harmless. It is incontrovertible that the district court, regardless of its 
determination relating to Dr. Von Moltke, found in favor of Rossignol and 
concluded that S.R. was competent to testify. (Tr., p.112, L.25 - p.113, L.2.) 
Error is harmless if the appellate court concludes, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that there was no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the 
conviction. State v. Cordova, 137 Idaho 635, 642, 51 P.3d 449, 456 (Ct. App. 
2002). Here, the error pertained to Rossignol's attempt to gather information 
regarding S.R.'s condition to testify. Because the district court found in favor of 
Rossignol and because S.R. testified, there is no basis for Rossignol to claim 
prejudice. 
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VI. 
Rossignol Has Failed To Show That The Cumulative Error Doctrine Applies To 
This Case 
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. 
Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate ,, 
to application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v. 
Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). Rossignol has failed to 
show that two or more errors occurred in his trial, and therefore the doctrine is 
inapplicable to this case. See, §.&, LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 121, 937 
P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997). Even if errors in the trial had been shown, they 
would not amount to a denial of due process that would require reversal. State v. 
Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Barcella, 
135 Idaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. App. 2000) (accumulation of errors 
deemed harmless). 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Rossignol's convictions. 
DATED this 14th day of October, 2008. 
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